On this point we must definitely break with any philosophy which, in the manner of vitalism, interprets our universe of experience as a scattered picture in which we find here what is purely physical, there what is biological, and there what is spiritual. . . . Inasmuch, however, as in biological interpretation, we are taking our experience more fully into account than in physical interpretation, biological interpretation is on a higher level, and represents reality less incompletely than physical interpretation.'

Again: * We must, as it seems to me, hold to the conclusion that life, since it is a part of our perceived experience, though we can as yet see no clear way towards relating it in detail to existing physical ideas, must be regarded as ultimately inherent in what we at present picture as inorganic phenomena.'[1]

Prof. Whitehead's view is essentially similar. His presentation differs from Haldane's chiefly in that he more explicitly recognizes the teleological nature of mental and vital activity. * The topic of every science is an abstraction from the full concrete happenings of Nature. But every abstraction neglects the influx of the factors omitted into the factors retained. . . . The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical Nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the composition of " really real " things whose interconnections and individual character constitute the universe. . . . We require that the deficiency in our concept of physical nature should be supplied by its fusion with life. And we require that, on the

other hand, the notion of life should involve the notion of physical nature.'

[1] The citations are from the last and most lucid of Haldane's many expositions: *The Philosophy of a Biologist* (i935)-